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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
REGDAB, INC., an Idaho Corporation
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Supreme Court No: 45649
Bonner County No. CV-17-0582

vs.
BUCK GRAYBILL and LAURIE
GRAYBILL,
Defendants/Appellants,
BORGES, LLC., an Idaho Limited
Liability Company; CHRISTOPHER B.
BORGES and ANNETTE E. GORGES,
husband and wife, and the marital
community comprised thereof;
PATRICK N. FERRICK and NATALIE
I. MAKEEVA thereof; and QUICKEN
LOANS, INC., a foreign corporation,
Defendants.
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District
Of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner
Honorable Barbara Buchanan, Presiding
_____________________________________________________
APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF
_____________________________________________________
Arthur M. Bistline
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC
1205 N. 3rd Street
Coeur d’Alene, ID 83814
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants

Matthew T. Ries
Stamper Rubens, P.S.
West 720 Boone, Ste. 200
Spokane, WA 99201
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent

A.

I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4)(b) is Not Inconsistent With Idaho Code 45-513 Because it
Has No Effect on the Operation of That Statute.

Regdab argues that IRCP 54(e)(4)(b) is inconsistent with Idaho Code 45-513 because 45513 mandates an award of fees. This argument fails because IRCP 54(e)(4)(b) does not prevent
the award of attorneys fees in a mechanics lien case, it just sets forth a prerequisite to obtaining
those fees in the matter proceeds by way of default.
When matters proceed by way of default, a prerequisite to receiving an award of fees is
that the statute relied upon and the amount sought be set forth. “This Court has stated that the
rule acts to “set out a different requirement for judgments by default-that the fee statute (other
than section 12–121) or contract provision and amount of any fee award sought be specifically
stated in the prayer of the complaint as a precondition to obtaining fees in a judgment by
default.” Magleby v. Garn, 154 Idaho 194, 197, 296 P.3d 400, 403 (2013). Citing Eighteen Mile
Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 720, 117 P.3d 130, 134 (2005).
The purpose of this requirement is to put the opposing party on notice of its potential liability. Id.
Regdab also argues that requiring that the amount of fees be plead is too difficult in a
mechanics lien case because it is difficult to know how much the fees will be. By the time a
matter is filed, if the case goes by default, then the majority of fees were spent prior to drafting
the complaint. It is not difficult to estimate the time to prepare default documents. No case has
ever held that fees for a default for failure to plead or otherwise defend can be awarded if the
amount of those fees are not specifically plead.
B.

The Greybills Did Not Actively Defend the Suit, Other Than to Defend
Against Judgment Being Entered Which Exceeded the Relief Sought in the
Complaint.

Regdab argues that it is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees because the Greybill’s,
“...defended against the substantive and procedural issues in the case and made numerous
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arguments as to why default judgment should not be entered and defended the case before
default was entered.” The Greybills did nothing to defend the suit other than to make sure that
Regdab did not obtain a judgment which exceeded the relief prayed for in the complaint. If
Regdab had not sought a Judgment that exceeded the relief it sought in the complaint, then
Greybill would not have defended it.
Gary Finney put in an appearance for Greybill on June 8th, 2017. (R.61) On June 12th,
2017, Regdab filed an Amended Complaint that still did not plead the amount of attorney’s fees
in the event of default. (R.73) Thereafter, Mr. Finney did not file an answer on behalf of
Greybill and on July 27th, 2017, Regdab moved for the entry of default, (R.111) which was
granted. (R.123) Presumably, Mr. Finney was relying on existing law which requires that default
fees be plead. Otherwise, Mr. Finney would have tried to set aside the default.
It was only after Regdab attempted to secure a default judgment that exceeded the relief
requested in its Complaint that Greybill took any action in the case. That is not defending the
substance of the claim and does not take this case out of the operation of the rule pertaining to
default fees.
C.

Allowing a Party to Amend its Complaint to Include an Amount of Fees in
the Event of Default Defeats the Purpose of the Rule Requiring Default Fees
be Plead.

Regdab argues that this Court should affirm the District Court on the alternative grounds
that the Complaint could have been amended to include default fees. If such a procedure were
allowed the purpose of the rule requiring that fees be plead would be defeated.
As set forth above, the purpose of the rule requiring default fees be plead is to put the
opposing party on notice of the potential liability if the party allows the matter to proceed by
default. Magleby v. Garn, 154 Idaho 194, 197, 296 P.3d 400, 403 (2013). Allowing a party to
amend the Complaint after default has been entered would defeat the purpose of this rule. The
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amount of fees in the event of default would be a moving target and the opposing party would
have no idea what its potential liability is if it allows the matter to proceed by default.
DATED this 17th day of September, 2018.
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Attorney for Appellants/Defendants
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